Contract theory: Impact on biopharmaceutical alliance structure and performance by TANERI, Niyazi & DE MEYER, Arnoud
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
6-2017
Contract theory: Impact on biopharmaceutical
alliance structure and performance
Niyazi TANERI
National University of Singapore
Arnoud DE MEYER
Singapore Management University, arnouddemeyer@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0617
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons, Strategic Management Policy
Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
TANERI, Niyazi and DE MEYER, Arnoud. Contract theory: Impact on biopharmaceutical alliance structure and performance.
(2017). Manufacturing and Service Operations Management. 19, (3), 453-471. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5269
MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
Vol. 19, No. 3, Summer 2017, pp. 453–471
http://pubsonline.informs.org/journal/msom/ ISSN 1523-4614 (print), ISSN 1526-5498 (online)
Contract Theory: Impact on Biopharmaceutical Alliance
Structure and Performance
Niyazi Taneri,a Arnoud De Meyerb
aNUS Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119245; b Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065
Contact: niyazi@nus.edu.sg (NT); arnouddemeyer@smu.edu.sg (ADM)
Received: May 23, 2013
Revised: December 30, 2014; October 1, 2015;
August 15, 2016
Accepted: October 11, 2016
Published Online in Articles in Advance:
June 29, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0617
Copyright: © 2017 INFORMS
Abstract. Alliances for new product development have been studied extensively in the
operations management literature. Alliances between an innovator and a partner create
value by utilizing their complementary capabilities. In this paper, we seek to understand
what drives the alliance structure: the choice between collaborative alliances where the
parties exert joint efforts and sequential alliances where, for the most part, the partner takes
over going forward. Our analysis of a data set of over 2,000 biopharmaceutical alliances
reveals our main finding: a key role of operational choices is to address contract theoretic concerns
faced by an alliance. We also find that aligning the choice with predictions based on contract
theory has consequences for performance. Therefore, our analysis not only has descriptive
power about the drivers of alliance choice, but also provides valuable insight into the
performance and eventual fate of alliances formed.
Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0617.
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1. Introduction
A dominant theme in the operations management
(OM) literature on new product development (NPD)
alliances is that parties to an alliance face at least one
of several contract theoretic concerns. In this paper, we
examinewhether firms address these concerns bymak-
ing better choices about the design of the NPD process
that determines the structure of the alliance. We fur-
ther explore the consequences of the choice for perfor-
mance. To do so, wemake use of data from the biophar-
maceutical industry, where alliances play a major role.
The importance of the biopharmaceutical industry
and of alliances within this industry is evident from
various statistics. U.S. spending on biopharmaceuti-
cal products in 2015 was $424.8 billion. Three quarters
of that value came from on-patent products recently
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) (Aitken et al. 2016). Over half of all approvals,
in turn, are given to alliances (Czerepak and Ryser
2008). Firms form alliances to realize benefits that
arise from their complementary capabilities (Doz and
Hamel 1998), and they clearly value them. According
to our data set of over 2,000 alliances, the average deal
value over 2008–2012 was $307 million (standard devi-
ation, $434 million). This observation is consistent with
the Thomson Reuters Recap Therapeutic Area Insights
(2013), which covers the same period.
We refer to the party that holds the intellectual prop-
erty rights to an innovation prior to the alliance as
the innovator, and the party that gets involved once
the alliance is formed as the partner. After committing
such high stakes to an alliance, the two parties cannot
afford to mismanage the operational implementation
of the NPD process. Indeed, when implementing an
alliance, Babler (2010, p. 146) states that the “structure
of a relationship should be designed to address the
needs of both parties.” This view is echoed by Menzel
and Xanthopoulos (2012), who suggest that assessing
how to deploy the skills of both parties is a must for a
successful alliance.
We classify the NPD process as either sequential
or collaborative. This classification has implications for
how the skills/efforts of the two parties are deployed.
We call this set of sequential and collaborative settings
the alliance structure. A sequential alliance structure
refers to an alliance where predominantly an initial set
of tasks carried out by an innovator is followed by fur-
ther development or marketing by a partner such that
only one party is exerting most of the efforts at any
point in time. In contrast, a collaborative alliance struc-
ture implies that once an agreement is signed, efforts
are exerted by the two parties concurrently on more
equal terms. These are commonly found archetypes
of alliance structures in biopharmaceutical alliances.
Ionis Pharmaceuticals (2017), for example, describe
two types of alliances. Regarding an alliance with Bio-
gen, they state that their partner is “responsible for
all global development, regulatory and commercializa-
tion activities and costs.” Regarding another alliance
with AstraZeneca they state “We and AstraZeneca are
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also developing IONIS-STAT3-2.5Rx for the treatment
of cancer.”
Two leading drugs by sales volume provide exam-
ples of sequential and collaborative alliance struc-
tures respectively. Crestor, targeting high cholesterol,
was initially developed by Shionogi of Japan and
then licensed to AstraZeneca, who further devel-
oped and marketed the product. Plavix, for the treat-
ment of heart disease, was initially discovered by
Sanofi-Aventis and codeveloped by Sanofi-Aventis and
Bristol-Myers Squibb after the latter joined Sanofi-
Aventis as a partner. The annual global sales for the
drugs were at $7 and $9 billion, respectively, at their
peaks (PMLiVE 2016).
It is evident from these examples that both alliance
structures have the potential to attain great success. At
the same time, they show that any opportunities that
are unnecessarily forgone may present a large oppor-
tunity cost. A quarter of alliances in our sample are
eventually terminated. To demonstrate the negative
impact a termination could potentially have, we pro-
vide anecdotal evidence of its share price implications.
An alliance between Pfizer and Celldex Therepeu-
tics aiming to develop a therapeutic cancer vaccine
was terminated when Pfizer announced that the drug
was no longer a strategic priority. Celldex’ share price
dropped by 26% as a result, despite their announce-
ment that they would continue development on their
own (Grogan 2010).
The alliance structure chosen is an important con-
sideration at the formation of the alliance as it may
have implications for the effectiveness of the subse-
quent operations of the alliance. Therefore, our first
research question is the following: What are the drivers
of the alliance structure? Specifically, we want to under-
stand how an innovator and a partner choose to imple-
ment their alliance in terms of the NPD process. Do
the two parties opt for a collaborative or a sequential
alliance structure? And can this choice be informed by
contract theory?
Our second research question is the following: Do
misalignments between predictions of alliance structure
based on contract theory and the actual alliance struc-
ture chosen have an impact on performance? We note
that a focus on terminations as a performance mea-
sure presents a conservative test of contract theory
predictions compared to other measures of perfor-
mance. If deviations from contract theory predictions
do increase the likelihood of an outcome as severe
as alliance termination, they can also be expected to
affect performance negatively in alliances that continue
to exist.1
In this paper, we take a two-step approach in our
empirical analysis of alliance structure and alliance
performance. First, we develop a model that pre-
dicts the choice between collaborative and sequen-
tial alliance structures. This model provides insight
into whether contract theoretic concerns influence the
choice of alliance structure. Second, we investigate
whether aligning alliance structure with the prediction
of the model has consequences for performance.We do
so by analyzing empirical models that predict which
alliances are more likely to be terminated. To address
endogeneity concerns in the second step of our analy-
sis, we make use of coarsened exact matching (CEM).
This is a method that creates a quasi-experimental
setting and ensures that observations exposed/not
exposed to a causal variable of interest have similar
predispositions to the dependent variable.
We make two main contributions to the literature.
First, much of the OM literature has focused on either
a collaborative or a sequential NPD process but not the
choice between the two. In contrast, we demonstrate
that the choice between these processes, which deter-
mines the structure for an alliance, is consistent with
predictions based on contractual hazards often stud-
ied in the OM literature: private information, holdup,
and risk aversion. Notably, our focus on operational
implementation decisions brings the alliance choice
question to the operations management domain. Sec-
ond, our findings also contribute to a growing body
of literature in economics, which has found mixed evi-
dence on whether contract choices, rather than oper-
ational choices, reflect the predictions of contract the-
ory (Cohen and Siegelman 2010). Importantly, we go
one step further than testing for conformity of deci-
sions with contract theory predictions. We investigate
the consequences of (mis)alignment between contract
theory predictions and the chosen alliance structure on
the subsequent performance of alliances. We find that
deviating from contract theory predictions increases
the probability of termination. Together, our findings
suggest that a key role of operational choices is to address
contract theoretic concerns faced by an alliance.
2. Literature Review
Our paper tests whether three contract theoretic con-
cerns guide the choice between collaborative and
sequential alliances and whether misalignment with
contract theory predictions hinder alliance perfor-
mance. In doing so, it relates to four streams of litera-
ture. First, it relates to the literature on NPD alliances
in OM. These papers make use of contract theory to
model the interaction between partners. Second, our
work relates to papers in economics testing for behav-
ior that is consistent with the presence of a contract
theoretic concern. Third, our work relates to papers in
strategy and management that study choices between
different types of alliances. Fourth, our paper also
relates to the literatures on alliance performance and
the performance impacts of misaligned governance.
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2.1. Contract Theory and NPD Alliances
Contract theory addresses concerns that arise as part
of the strategic interaction between two parties (e.g.,
Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, Salanié 2005, Laffont
and Martimort 2009). Our paper focuses on private
(asymmetric) information, holdup, and risk-aversion
concerns. Papers in the OM literature on NPD alliances
each address a subset of the above concerns and moral
hazard.2
Most papers model NPD as a sequential process,
where different parties carry out different stages, akin
to the sequential alliance structure we have described.
Jensen and Thursby (2001) consider the licensing of
university technologies to industrial partners and find
that equity is more effective than royalties in address-
ing moral hazard. Savva and Taneri (2015) question
why royalties coexist with equity and fixed fees. They
show that the use of equity deems royalties a more
effective tool against private information. Crama et al.
(2008) show that upfront fees, milestones, and royal-
ties can be used to address moral hazard concerns and
private information about technical success probabil-
ity estimates. In a sequential investment game where a
provider invests in research effort and a client invests
in development effort, Bhattacharya et al. (2015) show
that milestones, along with a verifiable signal from the
FDA, can address moral hazard, risk aversion, and the
holdup problem. Crama et al. (2017) show that con-
trol rights, options, and alliance timing can be used to
address moral hazard and private information.
Others model NPD as a parallel process, where two
parties exert concurrent efforts, akin to the collabora-
tive alliance structure we have described. Bhaskaran
andKrishnan (2009) find that the interplay between the
type of revenues generated and the type of uncertain-
ties faced determines the choice between innovation
sharing and investment sharing, both of which involve
a double moral hazard problem. Savva and Scholtes
(2014) show that codevelopment can mitigate the risk
of inefficient abandonments (holdup) but introduces
the risk of the innovator running out of capital. They
show that an option to revert to licensing in such a sce-
nario eases the latter concern. Modeling an innovator
and a marketer that exert joint efforts in research and
development (R&D) andmarketing, Xiao andXu (2012)
find that royalty revisions alleviate moral hazard but
heighten private information concerns.
In contrast to the prior OM literature, which has
focused on addressing contract theoretic concerns
within either a sequential or a collaborative frame-
work, we test whether the choice between the two can
address contract theoretic concerns.
2.2. Literature Testing Contract Theory
Literature in economics has been testing for behav-
ior that is consistent with the predictions of con-
tract theory with data from different sectors. Laffont
and Matoussi (1995) find that pure rental agreements
where all crop is kept by the tenant/farmer leads to
higher yield. This shows evidence of moral hazard.
Lazear (2000) also finds support for moral hazard; the
introduction of incentive payments increases produc-
tivity at an auto glass manufacturer. Finkelstein and
McGarry (2006) find evidence for private information
along two dimensions: people who know that they
have a high probability of needing a nursing home and
people who know that they have a lower appetite for
risk purchase insurance. However, empirical findings
are not always in line with theory. For example, Cawley
and Philipson (1999) find no evidence for asymmetric
information in the life insurance market. This mixed
evidence is also evident in a recent review of papers
testing for the moral hazard and private information
problems in various insurance markets (Cohen and
Siegelman 2010).
Relatively few papers have tested the implications of
contract theory in an R&D setting. They focus on the
use of long-term versus short-term incentives. Lerner
andWulf (2007) find that long-term incentives for R&D
heads have a positive impact on various measures of
R&D outcomes, while short-term incentives have lit-
tle impact. Azoulay et al. (2011) find that life science
researchers at an institution that rewards longer-term
productivity and tolerates early failure produce high-
impact articles at a higher rate than researchers at
another institution that has shorter review cycles. In a
laboratory setting, Ederer and Manso (2013) also find
that long-term incentives and tolerance for early failure
induce innovation through exploration.
Our paper extends the literature testing contract the-
ory in various dimensions. We test for multiple con-
tract theoretic concerns with operational decisions in
an R&D collaboration setting. We also go one step fur-
ther by studying the impact of aligning alliance struc-
ture with contract theoretic concerns on performance.
2.3. Literature on Alliance Choice
Our study testswhether contract theoretic concerns can
guide the choice between collaborative and sequential
alliances. Choices between different forms of alliances
havebeen studiedmorewidely in the strategy andman-
agement literatures. Colombo (2003) finds that firms
that are different in terms of technological specializa-
tion have a tendency to use equity. Oxley and Sampson
(2004) study the choice between contracts and joint
ventures and find scope to have an impact on alliance
choice. They also study the impact of judicial efficacy
and find no significant effect. Villalonga and McGahan
(2005) focus on the choice between alliances and other
formsof acquiring knowledge.Amongothers, theyfind
ownership structure to be an important factor.
We add to the alliance choice literature, as the
choices studied and the key drivers considered in the
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previously mentioned studies are different from our
emphasis on operational implementation and contract
theory. We also draw on this literature when identify-
ing control variables for our analysis.
2.4. Literature on Alliance Performance
and Misaligned Governance
Other studies pertain to the performance of alliances.
Schilling and Phelps (2007) find that firms embedded
in alliance networks that exhibit dense local cluster-
ing and high reach have greater innovative output.
Anand and Khanna (2000) find that more experience
with alliances has an influence on alliance success, as
measured by abnormal returns in the stock market.
For biotechnology–pharmaceutical alliances, Hoang
and Rothaermel (2005) find that the alliance experi-
ence of the biotechnology partner positively affects
joint project performance, while, interestingly, partner-
specific experience has a negative impact. Their perfor-
mance measure is the launch of a product.
Various studies take a transaction cost economics
perspective and find that misaligned governance leads
to poor performance (see, e.g., Leiblein et al. 2002,
Geyskens et al. 2006, Handley 2016). In the NPD do-
main, Sampson (2004) finds that deviations from pre-
dictions about the choice between equity joint ventures
and pooling contracts leads to poorer performance in
R&D collaborations. MacCormack and Mishra (2015)
find a similar result for the choice between fixed price
and time andmaterials/performance-based contracts.
We add to the alliance performance literature by in-
vestigating the impact of a different (mis)alignment:
one between contract theoretic concerns and the choice
of operational processes for new product development.
In summary, the OM literature on NPD alliances has
made use of contract theory, each paper tackling a sub-
set of concerns addressed by contract theory such as
private information or the holdup problem. The mod-
els in these papers have typically modeled NPD as
either a sequential or a collaborative process, but no
attention has been paid to the choice between the two.
Our study fills this gap in the literature by studying the
choice between collaborative and sequential alliances.
While the choice of different types of alliances (e.g.,
equity versus nonequity) has been studied in the strat-
egy and management literatures, the type of NPD pro-
cess adopted is an operational issue. This brings the
alliance choice question to the operations management
domain. Empirical research in economics has started
to test some implications of contract theory. In an
NPD setting, papers have shown better R&D output
for long-term incentives. In other contexts, researchers
have tested for the presence of contract theoretic con-
cerns such as private information and foundmixed evi-
dence. We make three contributions to this literature.
First, we test and find support for private information,
holdup, and risk aversion. Second, we test whether
risk aversion is more of a concern for smaller agents.
Third, prior studies test whether decision makers devi-
ate from the predictions of contract theory and provide
the results as evidence for or against the presence of
contract theoretic concerns. We go one step further. By
studying subsequent terminations in addition to the
choice of alliance structure, we test both whether deci-
sion makers deviate from contract theory predictions
and what the performance implications of deviating
from contract theory predictions are. This last contri-
bution also adds to the literature on alliance perfor-
mance and the literature on misaligned governance.
3. Hypothesis Development
In this paper, we seek to identify the drivers of alliance
structure and alliance performance. Various papers
have shown that frictions identified by contract theory
such as private information (e.g., Xiao and Xu 2012),
the holdup problem (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2015), and
risk aversion (e.g., Crama et al. 2008) play important
roles in NPD alliances.
Central to much of the contract theory literature is
the concept of asymmetric information. When one party
has private information, or is better informed than the
other, it can use this information to its advantage. Rela-
tionships are often hindered by the presence of private
information. In his seminal paper, Akerlof (1970) shows
that the presence of private information can lead to
the collapse of markets, destroying value for all parties
involved.
A solution to the problem is proposed by Spence
(1973). To address the problem, the holder of private
information may be able to carry out an action that
credibly conveys, or signals, the information it has to
the other party. Signals are typically costly, but the cost
depends on the type of information held. The party
that incurs a lower cost to send the signal can do so and
segment the market, thereby alleviating the problem.
Within the context of NPD, private information may
be due to differing fields of expertise across firms.
When this is the case, a partner may have a relative dis-
advantage in evaluating the quality of the innovator’s
research. As biotechnology companies typically have a
narrow research niche thatmay be difficult for others to
evaluate, we expect a nonbiotech partner to have con-
cerns about private information—in particular, about
the probability of success going forward.
The innovator can solve this problem by sending a
credible signal of a high quality product candidate. For
a signal to be credible it must cost less for the holder
of one type of information compared to the holder
of another type (e.g., an innovator with a higher ver-
sus lower success probability estimate). Collaborative
alliances demand more resources from the innovator
than sequential alliances where the partner takes over
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going forward. The expected net cost of these addi-
tional resources is higher for low success probability
innovators, who are less likely to recoup their fur-
ther investment, compared to high success probabil-
ity innovators. Therefore, a biotech innovator can sig-
nal the quality of its product candidate by continuing
its involvement in the project through a collaborative
alliance. The lower expected net cost for a high qual-
ity product creates a credible signal. In doing so, the
innovator would ease the private information concerns
of its partner. We therefore expect realized alliances
between biotech innovators and nonbiotech partners to
have a collaborative structure. This leads to our first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Signaling Hypothesis) (H1). If an alliance
involves a biotech innovator engaging with a nonbiotech
partner, the alliance will be more likely to adopt a collabora-
tive structure.
Another key problem addressed by contract the-
ory is the holdup problem. This problem occurs when
a party to a strategic interaction needs to make
upstream investments in relationship-specific assets,
while another party, who holds residual control rights,
makes downstream decisions. Because the latter party
cannot credibly commit to reimburse the former for
their investment, the former rightfully worries about
being held up and either does not make any investment
or underinvests (Grossman andHart 1986). This results
in below-par performance.
Contract theory suggests that having the party with
a comparative advantage make a relationship-specific
investment and allocating residual control rights to
them can alleviate the holdup problem (Hart 1995). On
the one hand, if one party has a comparative advan-
tage inmaking remaining investments, the investments
should bemade by that party, and control rights should
be allocated to them. On the other hand, when the two
sides have relative advantages in making remaining
investments, then joint ownership of residual control
rights is in order.
The holdup problem is likely to occur in new prod-
uct development alliances in the biopharmaceutical
industry where investments at any stage of develop-
ment are relationship specific. For example, the recruit-
ment of patients for clinical trials and the effort sci-
entists put into drug development and the training of
employees for the marketing of a specific product are
all relationship-specific investments. They have little or
no value outside the context of the alliance.
Biopharmaceutical products go through various
stages of development starting from formulation, to
clinical trials, through to marketing. At the embryonic
stages of development, comparative advantage usually
lies with the innovator who knows the specific product
candidate best. At later stages of development, com-
parative advantage shifts toward the partner whomwe
can expect to have more experience with later stage
clinical trials and marketing.
Typically, collaborative alliances allocate residual
control rights to both the innovator and the part-
ner, while sequential alliances allocate residual con-
trol rights to the partner. On the one hand, when an
alliance is formed at an early stage of the NPD cycle,
there are many steps down the road where either party
can have a comparative advantage. On the other hand,
when an alliance is formed at a late stage, comparative
advantage lies with the partner. Thus, wewould expect
a collaborative alliance structure in the former case
where both parties have control rights, and a sequen-
tial alliance structure in the latter where the partner is
typically allocated control rights.
Hypothesis 2 (Holdup Hypothesis) (H2). The later in the
NPD cycle an alliance is formed, the less likely that a collab-
orative structure will be adopted.
Risk aversion is another concern addressed by both
the general contract theory literature and the opera-
tions management literature on new product devel-
opment (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2015). Typically, the
agent is modeled as risk averse and the principal as
risk neutral.
To address the issue, the principal must make an
offer that appeases the risk concerns of the agent by
limiting the agent’s exposure to risk. Both Salanié
(2005) and Laffont and Martimort (2009) show that the
more risk aversion is a concern, the more the principal
leans toward fixed payments. The degree of concern,
in turn, depends on the level of risk and/or the level of
risk aversion.
In the operations management literature, Crama
et al. (2008) model the innovator as either risk averse
or risk neutral, while the partner is assumed to be risk
neutral. Similarly, Bhattacharya et al. (2015) model the
innovator as risk averse and the partner as risk neu-
tral. The argument they provide for risk-averse innova-
tor firms is that partner firms are typically larger than
innovator firms, which allows them to have a larger
and more diversified R&D project portfolio. Indeed,
Elton and Gruber (1977) show that the risk associated
with a portfolio of N assets is decreasing in the num-
ber of assets N because of diversification. Having more
diversified portfolios puts partner firms in a better
position to absorb risk, leading to lower risk aversion.
The relationship between firm size and risk aversion
can also be inferred from the use of different discount
rates to evaluate risky projects. Large pharmaceuticals
use much lower discount rates than small biotechnol-
ogy firms (Villiger and Bogdan 2005). The average part-
ner in our sample is seven times larger than the average
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innovator. Therefore, the average innovatormay be risk
averse when compared to the average partner.
Managers at biopharmaceutical firms have access
to historical failure rates for drugs targeting differ-
ent disease indications. For example, drugs targeting
respiratory diseases are half as likely to succeed as
those targeting gastrointestinal diseases (DiMasi 2001).
The innovator’s exposure to further risk can be lim-
ited through a sequential alliance, where most of the
downstream outlay of efforts and cash are borne by the
partner. In contrast, a collaborative alliance requires
a higher resource commitment from the innovator,
thereby increasing their exposure to risk. Therefore,
we expect that alliances with a higher risk of failure
will more likely be associatedwith a sequential alliance
structure and will less likely be associated with a col-
laborative alliance structure.
Hypothesis 3A (Risk Hypothesis-A) (H3A). A higher risk
of failure will decrease the probability of a collaborative
alliance structure being adopted.
Hypothesis 3A essentially suggests that if innovators
are risk averse, higher risk should lead to a sequen-
tial alliance structure. On the flip side, we should also
expect that the more risk averse an innovator is, the
stronger their preference for a sequential alliance struc-
ture will be.
As we can infer from the Elton and Gruber (1977)
study, the number of projects in a firm’s portfolio
should decrease the risk in the overall portfolio. Larger
firms, in turn, are more likely to have larger portfolios.
Smaller innovators, who cannot diversify away their
risk, should have a strong preference for sequential
alliances. Larger innovators, who can diversify away
their risk (much like their partners), should have a
weaker preference for sequential alliance structures.
Therefore, the size of the innovator firm should mod-
erate the effect of risk.
Hypothesis 3B (Risk Hypothesis-B) (H3B). The smaller the
innovator, the more pronounced the negative effect of risk on
the adoption of a collaborative alliance structure will be.
We further note that papers in the OM literature
on R&D alliances have adopted different approaches
when modeling the utility of the innovator. While all
papers agree that the partner should be modeled as a
risk-neutral agent, there does not seem to be consensus
aboutwhether the innovator should bemodeled as risk
averse or risk neutral. For instance, both Bhattacharya
et al. (2015) and Crama et al. (2017) model the part-
ner as risk neutral. The former models the innovator
as risk averse. The latter models the innovator as risk
neutral. Testing Hypotheses 3A and 3B will therefore
also inform modeling choices in the OM literature.
The first set of hypotheses are about the use
of alliance structure to address contract theoretic
concerns faced by the innovator and the partner.
These hypotheses will be tested with a binary choice
model predicting the outcomes collaborative (1) versus
sequential (0). The actual choice may be the same as or
the opposite of the predicted value.
So far, we have argued that the choice matters be-
cause the choice allows the parties to address a vari-
ety of concerns identified by contract theory. Conse-
quently, our final hypothesis suggests that not aligning
alliance structure with the contract theoretic concerns
faced by the alliance should lead to poorer perfor-
mance. In its most severe form, this should lead to the
termination of the alliance.
Hypothesis 4 (Structural Alignment Hypothesis) (H4).
When the choice of the two parties is different from the predic-
tion of the proposed alliance structure model, the probability
of a termination will be higher.
4. Data Set and Variables
Our data set consists of 2,892, single-stage biopharma-
ceutical licenses for which the deal size was reported
in the Reuters Recap Database. The analysis was lim-
ited to alliances that were formed between 1990 and
the first quarter of 2014. We removed alliances that
involve more than two parties, universities, hospi-
tals, and nonprofit organizations. We were left with
2,435 data points. Of the remaining company-to-
company alliances, we were unable to find some of the
company-specific information for at least one of the
two parties in 330 alliances. This left us with a final
data set of 2,105 alliances.
Of the final data set, 984 alliances adopted a collab-
orative alliance structure and 1,121 adopted a sequen-
tial structure. Company-specific information such as
the number of employees or ownership structure were
obtained from official websites of companies, annual
reports, and online company profiles (e.g., Business-
Week, Bloomberg, Financial Times, or LinkedIn). Data
on the strength of property laws in different coun-
tries are from a data set by the Heritage Foundation
and theWall Street Journal. All other variables are from
the Reuters Recap Database. For both collaborative
and sequential alliances, the database classifies parties
forming an alliance as licensors and licensees. When
we refer to innovators in our hypotheses or variables,
this maps onto licensors in the database. The same is
true for partners and licensees.
A description of the dependent and independent
variables is given in Table 1, and summary statistics
for the same set of variables are given in Table 2. We
include a categorical variable, partnerID, for any part-
ner that appears 25 times or more in the database. We
label these 13 companieswith thenumbers 1 through13
rather than list their names to avoid any inference about
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Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
collaborative
(dependent variable)
Indicates whether an alliance has a collaborative alliance structure (1) or a sequential alliance structure (0). In
addition to being classified as licensing agreements, the alliances that involve joint efforts by the two parties
are listed as copromotion, comarketing, collaboration, or codevelopment agreements by the Reuters Recap
Database. We classify all such alliances as collaborative (1) and others as sequential (0).
terminated
(dependent variable)
Indicates whether the alliance was terminated (1) or otherwise (0)
year Indicates the year when an alliance was formed
deal_size The value, in U.S. dollars (millions), of upfront and milestone payments as part of the alliance
exclusive Indicates whether an alliance involves an exclusive license (1) or a nonexclusive license, which allows the
innovator to license out to other partners (0)
worldwide Indicates whether an alliance involves a license with worldwide coverage (1) or otherwise (0)
innov_size Natural logarithm of the number of people employed by the innovator
innov_private Indicates whether the innovator is privately owned (1) or publicly owned (0)
partner_size Natural logarithm of the number of people employed by the partner
partner_private Indicates whether the partner is privately owned (1) or publicly owned (0)
alliance_experience Gives the number of alliances that the partner has been involved with
innov_law_score Gives the property rights score of the country where the innovator is based
part_law_score Gives the property rights score of the country where the partner is based
relative_industry_exp Year innovator was founded−Year partner was founded
diff_country Indicates whether the innovator and partner are based in different countries (1) or otherwise (0)
bio_to_other (H1) Indicates whether the innovator is a biotechnology company while the partner is not (1) or otherwise (0)
npd_cycle (H2) The stage within the new product development cycle ranging from formulation (1) to approved/marketing (9)
(scale: formulation (1), discovery (2), lead molecule (3), preclinical (4), Phase I (5), Phase II (6), Phase III (7),
BLA/NDA filed (8), and approved/marketing (9))
risk (H3) The probability that the alliance fails in all therapeutic areas that it targets
Note. BLA, biologics license; NDA, new drug application.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Dependent and
Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
collaborative 0.467 0.499 0 1
terminated 0.201 0.401 0 1
year 2002.098 5.967 1990 2014
deal_size 129.738 314.249 0 6,900
exclusive 0.641 0.48 0 1
worldwide 0.477 0.5 0 1
innov_size 5.151 2.33 0 11.813
innov_private 0.256 0.437 0 1
partner_size 8.42957 2.825006 0 11.91839
partner_private 0.222 0.416 0 1
alliance_experience 24.85 30.276 1 108
innov_law_score 84.44656 5.742421 10 95
part_law_score 83.76722 7.445172 20 90
relative_industry_exp 38.51 71.848 −344 342
diff_country 0.515 0.5 0 1
bio_to_other 0.537 0.499 0 1
risk 0.78 0.098 0.272 0.883
npd_cycle 4.051 2.322 1 9
the alliance performance of specific companies. Sum-
mary statistics for these 13 companies are provided in
Table 3. As many companies appear repeatedly but not
in all years, we note that we have an unbalanced longi-
tudinal data set.We focuson the 13 partners that appear
at least once a year on average, i.e., 25 times ormore over
the time span of the data set, and also note that many of
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Cluster Variables
Partner ID Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
partnerID 1 0.0304038 0.1717365 0 1
partnerID 2 0.0289786 0.1677863 0 1
partnerID 3 0.016152 0.12609 0 1
partnerID 4 0.039905 0.1957825 0 1
partnerID 5 0.0513064 0.2206744 0 1
partnerID 6 0.0247031 0.1552556 0 1
partnerID 7 0.0137767 0.1165907 0 1
partnerID 8 0.0123515 0.1104753 0 1
partnerID 9 0.0228029 0.14931 0 1
partnerID 10 0.015677 0.1242519 0 1
partnerID 11 0.0223278 0.1477824 0 1
partnerID 12 0.0266033 0.1609593 0 1
partnerID 13 0.023753 0.1523148 0 1
these companies appear multiple times not just across
years but also within years.
While the descriptions provided in Table 1 are self
explanatory for most variables, we provide more detail
on the variable risk. Based onU.S. marketing approvals,
DiMasi (2001) reports typical success probabilities, p j ,
for therapeutic areas j, where j is one of the thera-
peutic areas anti-infective, antineoplastic, cardiovascu-
lar, central nervous system, endocrine, gastrointestinal,
immunologic, respiratory, or miscellaneous. Alliances
in our data set may target one or more therapeutic
areas. For those that target a single therapeutic area, we
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.4
3.7
7]
 on
 12
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
17
, a
t 0
0:4
7 .
 Fo
r p
ers
on
al 
us
e o
nly
, a
ll r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Taneri and De Meyer: Contract Theory: Impact on Alliance Structure and Performance
460 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2017, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 453–471, ©2017 INFORMS
define a risk measure f j  1− p j , which gives the prob-
ability of failure for that therapeutic area. For alliances
that target more than one therapeutic area, we use the
risk measure ∏ j f j for all j targeted by the alliance,
which gives the product of the failure probabilities
for each therapeutic area targeted, or the probability
that the alliance fails for all therapeutic areas targeted,
assuming that the failure probabilities across therapeu-
tic areas are independent. We also note that DiMasi
(2001) reports current and maximum possible success
rates for each of the therapeutic categories. When the
two are equal (due to no continuing development) we
use the current value. When the maximum possible
is higher (due to continuing development) we use the
midpoint of the two probabilities reported.
We report pairwise correlation coefficients across the
independent variables and their significance levels in
the online appendix. None of the correlation coeffi-
cients are worryingly high.
5. Results
We split our results according to the two research ques-
tions: (1) What are the drivers of alliance structure and
can contract theory inform the choice? (2) Does devi-
ating from predictions of alliance structure based on
contract theory have implications for performance?
5.1. Models for Alliance Structure
The dependent variable in the first step of our analy-
sis is a binary outcome indicating whether the compa-
nies in an alliance opted for a collaborative or sequen-
tial structure, coded as 1 and 0, respectively. We use
a mixed effects logistic regression model that allows
for random intercepts for partner IDs. This multilevel
approach allows for the analysis of alliances at a lower
level, which are nested within aggregate clusters of
observations for partners at a higher level. Formultino-
mial choices, McFadden and Train (2000) show that the
mixed logit model can approximate any choice model,
while the reverse is not true. Indeed, likelihood ratio
tests reveal that mixed effects logistic regression mod-
els are a better fit than logistic regression for all five
models estimated in Table 4.
The sequence of models in Table 4 explains the
choice of alliance structure. Model 1 includes a variable
for trend only. Model 2 introduces control variables for
innovator, partner, and deal characteristics. Model 3
introduces relative characteristics for the two parties
and measures of property rights for the countries
where they are headquartered. Model 4 introduces
variables that test hypotheses regarding the implica-
tions of contract theory. Model 5 introduces an interac-
tion term that allows us to test the moderating effect of
innovator firm size on the effect of risk.
We first note that three of the control variables—
deal_size, which gives the value of the transaction in
millions of dollars; exclusive, which indicates whether
or not the license is exclusive; and partner_size, which
gives the natural logarithm of the number of people
employed by the partner—are all consistently signifi-
cant across all models. All three variables are positively
associated with a collaborative structure. These results
suggest that for more valuable alliances, the innovator
continues to be involved, that innovators are more will-
ing to grant exclusive licenses when they continue to
be involved in further efforts, and that larger partners
tend to be involved in collaborative alliances.
We now discuss hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3A) that
test the implications of contract theory for alliance
structure based on the results of Model 4 of Table 4.
The first hypothesis suggests that differing R&D exper-
tise across the two parties forming an alliance leads
to asymmetric information. Asymmetric information
will be more of a concern for alliances that involve
a biotech innovator with highly specialized research
skills interacting with a nonbiotech partner. Contract
theory indicates that when this is the case, an informed
party who incurs a lower cost to send a signal can do so
and credibly convey their information. Collaborative
alliances require further resources from the innovator
but a high-success-probability innovator has a higher
chance of recouping its investment, which makes the
expected net cost lower. Such an innovator can signal
the quality of its innovation by opting for a collabora-
tive alliance structure. Therefore, when the innovator
is a biotech while the partner is not, we expect that the
alliance will more likely be structured as a collabora-
tive alliance. The coefficient of the variable bio_to_other
is positive and significant at the 1% level. This provides
strong support for the first (signaling) hypothesis.
The second hypothesis is about the holdup prob-
lem. Contract theory suggests that the allocation of
residual control rights to the party who has a com-
parative advantage in exerting efforts required going
forward can alleviate the holdup problem. An innova-
tor is likely to have a comparative advantage in early
stage research, while a partner is likely to have a com-
parative advantage in larger scale, later stage confir-
matory clinical trials and marketing. For an early stage
alliance, all of these steps lie ahead, and it is benefi-
cial for the two parties to share control rights. When
the alliance is formed at a later stage of the NPD cycle
and the product moves closer to market, the compara-
tive advantage balance shifts toward the partner, and it
becomes more beneficial to assign control rights to the
partner. This indicates a collaborative alliance struc-
ture for earlier stages of the new product development
cycle and a sequential alliance structure as one moves
through stages. We find that the coefficient for the vari-
able npd_cycle has the expected negative sign and is
significant at the 0.1% level, providing strong support
for the second (holdup) hypothesis.
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Table 4. Models for Alliance Structure (Dependent Variable: collaborative)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
year 0.0257∗∗∗ −0.0045 −0.0029 0.0111 0.0107
(0.0077) (0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0095) (0.0095)
deal_value 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
exclusive 0.2492∗ 0.2456∗ 0.4285∗∗∗ 0.4255∗∗∗
(0.1086) (0.1098) (0.1168) (0.1170)
worldwide 0.2891∗∗ 0.3010∗∗ 0.1038 0.1000
(0.1041) (0.1061) (0.1127) (0.1128)
innov_size −0.0441∗ −0.0318 −0.0062 −0.2767
(0.0212) (0.0227) (0.0236) (0.1817)
innov_private 0.0891 0.0827 0.0399 0.0413
(0.1101) (0.1105) (0.1125) (0.1126)
partner_size 0.1551∗∗∗ 0.1329∗∗∗ 0.1137∗∗∗ 0.1143∗∗∗
(0.0243) (0.0266) (0.0282) (0.0282)
partner_private 0.1345 0.1223 0.1106 0.1053
(0.1195) (0.1201) (0.1222) (0.1223)
alliance_experience 0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0012 −0.0014
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052)
innov_law_score 0.0030 0.0041 0.0045
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0090)
part_law_score 0.0085 0.0061 0.0062
(0.0071) (0.0073) (0.0073)
relative_industry_exp 0.0020∗ 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
diff_country 0.0935 0.0861 0.0868
(0.1011) (0.1035) (0.1036)
bio_to_other (H1) 0.3666∗∗ 0.3715∗∗
(0.1222) (0.1223)
npd_cycle (H2) −0.1666∗∗∗ −0.1662∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0244)
risk (H3A) −1.6947∗∗∗ −3.5037∗∗
(0.5051) (1.3078)
risk× innov_size (H3B) 0.3471
(0.2309)
_cons −51.1579∗∗∗ 7.1156 3.0414 −23.1171 −21.0085
(15.3499) (18.0100) (18.4427) (19.0991) (19.1937)
N 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
Log likelihood −1411.7655 −1311.2344 −1307.7704 −1275.4147 −1274.2739
χ2 11.2485 157.8733 163.4606 208.0863 210.0258
Likelihood ratio test p-value 0.0000 0.0008 0.0023 0.0027 0.0024
Pseudo-R2 a 0.0423 0.1101 0.1126 0.1349 0.1357
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
aPseudo-R2 values are not available for mixed effects models. We report values from corresponding
logistic regressions.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Hypothesis 3A relates to an inherent characteristic
of one of the parties involved in the alliance. When
the risk aversion of the innovator is of key concern,
the innovator’s exposure to further risk can be lim-
ited through a sequential alliance. Risk aversion will
be more of a concern when the level of risk associated
with the alliance is high. Therefore, the higher the risk,
the less likely that we will have a collaborative alliance
structure. Indeed, the coefficient for the variable risk
has a negative sign and is significant at the 0.1% level,
providing strong support for Hypothesis 3A.
Hypothesis 3B also relates to the effect of risk but
introduces an interaction term to test for the mod-
erating effect of innovator firm size. In Model 5, we
introduce the interaction term risk × innov_size to test
this hypothesis. We had argued that innovator firms
are typically smaller than partner firms, and because
smaller firms cannot diversify away their risk, innova-
tor firms should exhibit more risk aversion than their
partners. If this holds between an innovator and a part-
ner, the level of risk aversion should also be different
across innovators of different size. Rather than make
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an argument about the level of risk, this hypothesis
suggests that the more risk averse an innovator is, the
more important the risk element of the alliance will
be. While we should still expect risk to have a neg-
ative impact for the choice of a collaborative alliance
structure, this effect should be moderated by the size
of the innovator firm. This suggests that the variable
risk should still have a negative sign, but the interac-
tion term risk× innov_size should have a positive sign.
We can see from Model 5 that both of these variables
have the expected sign. In a review of studies employ-
ing interaction terms, Brambor et al. (2006) suggest
that authors should (a) include the interaction term
and the two constituent variables in their regressions,
and (b) check the significance of meaningful marginal
effects rather than the significance of the coefficients.
In particular, they emphasize the analysis of marginal
effects for the variable of interest (risk in our case) when
holding the modifying variable (innov_size in our case)
constant at different values. In Table 5, we report the
marginal effects w.r.t. risk when innov_size is held con-
stant at its mean, mean ± 1 standard deviation, and
mean ± 2 standard deviations. We can make three
observations from this table. First, the marginal effect
of risk is negative for all five values at which the mod-
ifying variable is held constant. Second, the effect of
risk is more pronounced for smaller innovators than
for larger innovators. Third, the effect is significant at
the 1% level when innovator size is at its mean or lower,
but insignificant when innovator size is larger. Taken
together, these findings provide support for Hypoth-
esis 3B. Risk aversion, and therefore project risk, is
a more important factor when forming alliances with
smaller innovators.
Table 5. Marginal Effects: collaborative w.r.t. riskWhen innov_size Held Constant
innov_size
held constant at dy/dx Std. err. z P > |z | [95% conf. interval]
Mean− 2 s.d. −0.7800017 0.2829742 −2.76 0.006 −1.334621 −0.2253826
Mean− 1 s.d. −0.5898632 0.1765074 −3.34 0.001 −0.9358113 −0.2439151
Mean −0.4002549 0.1188998 −3.37 0.001 −0.6332943 −0.1672155
Mean+ 1 s.d. −0.2112243 0.1694498 −1.25 0.213 −0.5433399 0.1208913
Mean+ 2 s.d. −0.0228182 0.2730681 −0.08 0.933 −0.5580219 0.5123854
Note. The table showsmarginal effects calculated when all other variables are held constant at their means.
Table 6. Marginal Effects for Significant Variables: Model 5 of Table 4
Variable dy/dx Std. err. z P > |z | [95% conf. interval]
deal_value 0.0006317 0.0000839 7.53 0.000 0.0004673 0.0007962
exclusive 0.099265 0.0275063 3.61 0.000 0.0453535 0.1531764
partner_size 0.0266615 0.0067017 3.98 0.000 0.0135263 0.0397966
bio_to_other 0.0866554 0.0284836 3.04 0.002 0.0308286 0.1424821
npd_cycle −0.0387596 0.0056655 −6.84 0.000 −0.0498638 −0.0276554
risk −0.4002549 0.1188998 −3.37 0.001 −0.6332943 −0.1672155
Note. The table showsmarginal effects calculated when all other variables are held constant at their means.
Taken together, Hypotheses 3A and 3B also have
implications for modeling choices of researchers. Some
papers in the literature model both parties as risk neu-
tral, while others model the innovator as risk averse.
Hypothesis 3A suggests that innovators are indeed risk
averse. Hypothesis 3B suggests that this risk aversion
depends on firm size, with many innovators in bio-
pharmaceutical alliances being risk averse but larger
innovators not so.
The analysis in Table 4 only gives us directional
effects. The marginal effects for the significant vari-
ables in Model 5 of Table 4 are reported in Table 6.
They tell us how the probability of forming a collab-
orative alliance changes when one variable is varied
(either from its own mean or from zero for a binary
variable) while all other variables are held constant at
their means.
First of all, note that all of the marginal effects are
significant. We can see from these results that two
binary variables have a large impact on the forming
of collaborative alliances. When an exclusive license is
involved, this increases the chance of a collaborative
alliance, in absolute terms, by about 10%. Alliances
that involve a biotechnology company as the innova-
tor and a firm that is not a biotechnology company as
the partner have a 9% higher chance of forming a col-
laborative alliance. Alliances that involve larger trans-
actions in terms of money transfer from one party to
the other are more likely to be collaborative; an addi-
tional $100,000,000 of value implies a 6% higher chance
of a collaborative structure. We remind the reader here
that the average deal size for our sample is about
$130,000,000 with a standard deviation in excess of
$300,000,000. In an alliance for which the risk of failure
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Table 7. Classification Table for Model 5 of Table 4
Predicted
Collaborative Sequential Total
Actual
Collaborative 600 384 984
Sequential 265 856 1,121
Total 865 1,240 2,105
is 10% higher in absolute terms, the chance of a collab-
orative alliance is 4% lower. Alliances that are formed
one stage later in the new product development cycle
are about 4% less likely to have a collaborative struc-
ture. A 1% increase in the number of employees for the
partner leads to a 3% higher chance of a collaborative
alliance structure.
Table 7 provides information on the predictive
power of our model. We follow accepted convention
and classify a prediction as collaborative when the pre-
dicted probability of a collaborative alliance is greater
than 0.5 and as sequential otherwise. The overall prob-
ability of a collaborative alliance is 0.467, while the con-
ditional probability that the actual alliance structure is
collaborative given that the prediction is collaborative
is P(col | pred_col)  0.694. Similarly, the overall prob-
ability of a sequential alliance is 0.533, while P(seq |
pred_seq)  0.690. The overall probability of a correct
prediction is 0.692. This is a 38% improvement over a
model that allocates predictions based on the proba-
bilities 0.467 and 0.533 for collaborative and sequential
alliances, respectively.
5.2. Models for Alliance Performance
Our analysis so far indicates that companies should
and often do align alliance structure with concerns
addressed by contract theory. In this section, we test
whether deviating from the “recommended” alliance
structure has consequences for performance.
In addition to the type of alliance formed, Recap also
lists whether alliances have been terminated. We want
to knowwhether insisting on one type of alliance struc-
ture while our alliance structure model implies the
other leads to more frequent termination of alliances.
We assume that a termination is a negative outcome for
three reasons. First, the risk of termination is accepted
as a potential downside of working with a partner in
the biopharmaceutical industry. Bogdan and Villiger
(2008, p. 169) note that a partner, despite alliance ben-
efits, adds the risk that “the project is halted even if
there are no concerns related to safety and efficacy.”
Second, while an alliance can end because of an acqui-
sition, these are indicated in the database with the
acronym “acq,” as opposed to “ter,” which reassures
us that terminations, as indicated in our database, are
negative outcomes. Third, we observe anecdotal evi-
dence that terminations lead to falls in share prices for
public firms.
The dependent variable in the second step of our
analysis is a binary outcome indicating whether a ter-
mination has been observed for an alliance. Alliances
that were terminated are coded as 1, and others
are coded as 0. The explanatory variable of inter-
est, denoted by D, indicates whether the two parties
chose the alliance structure indicated by Model 5 of
Table 4 (0) or deviated from the suggested alliance
structure (1). In the remainder of this paper, we call
the group of alliances for which the variable D takes
on the value 1 the treated or treatment group and the
remaining observations the control group. As the value
of D is a result of the two parties’ choice, it is subject
to an endogeneity problem that could lead to biases in
estimates. We are interested in estimating
terminated(Yi) α+ β′Xi + δDi + i ,
and particularly the sign of the coefficient δ, or the
effect of the treatment on terminations.3 The problem
is that, with a simple binary choice model, the estimate
for δ would be inconsistent and biased because D is
correlated with the error term  (Kennedy 2008).
To address the issue, wemake use of coarsened exact
matching. Thismethod nonparametrically balances the
variables in X across treated and control groups (Iacus
et al. 2012, 2011). In doing so, the method drops obser-
vations from the sample of X and Y until the remain-
ing distribution of X is equivalent for both the treat-
ment and control cases (Morgan and Winship 2014).
This creates distinct strata for which treated and con-
trol groups are comparable on observable characteris-
tics, which ensures that both the treated and control
groups have similar predispositions to terminations.
The impact of the treatment is revealed by compar-
ing treated alliances with control alliances in the same
strata.When sufficient balancing across the treated and
control groups is achieved, the estimated effect, δ, can
be attributed solely to the effect of the treatment: a
deviation from the recommended alliance structure in
our case.
Making use of CEM as an effective method for
addressing endogeneity is a recent trend across fields
(e.g., Aggarwal and Hsu 2013, Azoulay et al. 2013,
Feldman et al. 2016, Hallen et al. 2014, Kim and King
2014). In effect, CEM creates a quasi-experimental
setting by sampling comparable treatment and con-
trol cases from a larger pool of data before running
commonly accepted parametric analyses. The method
has also been adopted in healthcare where, tradition-
ally, randomized experiments are used to identify the
effects of treatments. CEMhas been used to analyze the
effect of a treatment variable in cases where an analysis
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was to be done ex post so a fully randomized experi-
ment could not be designed. For instance, Obermeyer
et al. (2014) analyze the impact of opting for hospice
care on healthcare utilization and cost.
When choosing which explanatory variables to
match the control and treatment groups across, one
needs to make trade-offs between the number of vari-
ables chosen and the number of observations remain-
ing. Matching across more variables creates a closer
match between the control and treatment groups but
reduces the number of observations remaining. Ini-
tially, wematch control and treated cases across the fol-
lowing variables: (1) year, (2) bio_to_other, (3) exclusive,
(4) worldwide, (5) innov_private, and (6) npd_cycle. These
variables were chosen because they are either binary
or ordered variables, which facilitates the matching
process. The ordered variables are coarsened by the
matching algorithm to create strata within which the
treated and control groups match. We make use of
the matching algorithm in Blackwell et al. (2009). As a
robustness check, we also compare our results to mod-
els where continuous variables were coarsened and
included in the analysis. This leads to very similar
results as reported in the next section.
As the dependent variable, terminated, is binary, we
use a logistic regressionmodelwith cluster robust stan-
dard errors and partner fixed effects to predict termina-
tions. When analyzing matched data, observations are
weighted according to the size of their strata (Blackwell
et al. 2009). We note that the mixed effects logistic
regression model cannot be used, as the associated
Stata command does not allow for weights, while the
command for logistic regression does.
Before reporting results, we note that drug develop-
ment is a lengthy process, often taking about 10 years
from lab bench to product launch. While our data set
covers alliances formed as recently as 2014, termina-
tions may happen long after an alliance is formed.
To avoid censoring problems, we only considered
alliances formed between 1990 and 2004. This gave
us a total of 1,332 alliances, of which 320 (24%) were
terminated. The effect of censoring was immediately
apparent. For the remaining 773 alliances in the period
2005–2014, we observed 103 terminations (13%).
Models in Table 8 pertain to Hypothesis 4 on alliance
performance. Models 1 and 2 are run with a matched
sample, while Models 3 and 4 are corresponding mod-
els with the full sample and no matching. Model 1
includes only the treatment variable D and partner
fixed effects. Model 2 includes the treatment variableD
along with all other explanatory variables. The coeffi-
cient for the treatment variable is positive and signif-
icant at the 0.1% level, providing strong support for
our structural alignment hypothesis. This suggests that
deviations from the recommendation of Model 5 of
Table 8. Logistic Regression Models for Alliance
Performance (Dependent Variable: terminated)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CEM CEM No CEM No CEM
D 0.5568∗∗∗ 0.6835∗∗∗ 0.3340∗∗ 0.3464∗∗
(0.1190) (0.1390) (0.1222) (0.1181)
year −0.0239 −0.0703∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0131)
deal_value 0.0025 0.0014
(0.0026) (0.0009)
exclusive 1.5179∗∗∗ 0.7494∗∗∗
(0.3593) (0.1511)
worldwide −0.5571∗ −0.3236∗
(0.2789) (0.1272)
innov_size −0.1522 −0.1087
(0.1802) (0.1071)
innov_private −1.1398∗∗ −0.6785∗∗∗
(0.3745) (0.1445)
partner_size 0.1216∗∗ 0.0618∗∗
(0.0437) (0.0218)
partner_private 0.0267 0.0531
(0.1677) (0.1852)
alliance_experience 0.0061 −0.0018
(0.0106) (0.0043)
innov_law_score −0.0139 −0.0044
(0.0127) (0.0097)
part_law_score 0.0521∗∗ 0.0254
(0.0175) (0.0140)
relative_industry_exp −0.0004 0.0019
(0.0018) (0.0015)
diff_country −0.3273∗∗ −0.0999
(0.1256) (0.1305)
bio_to_other 0.8421∗∗∗ 0.6084∗∗∗
(0.1733) (0.1318)
npd_cycle 0.1420∗∗ 0.1352∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0215)
risk −3.0874∗ −1.3040
(1.2418) (1.3154)
risk× innov_size 0.0943 −0.0055
(0.1562) (0.1134)
_cons −1.5846∗∗∗ 43.3097 −1.3927∗∗∗ 137.3896∗∗∗
(0.0584) (31.1774) (0.0438) (26.4330)
Partner FE Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
N 734 734 1,326 1,326
Log likelihood −374.1942 −310.1385 −714.8290 −644.9973
Pseudo-R2 0.0516 0.2140 0.0245 0.1198
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 4 increase the risk that an alliance will be termi-
nated. Furthermore, comparing these results to Mod-
els 3 and 4, we can see that the effect of the treatment
would have been biased downward without match-
ing. Combined with the previous hypotheses tested,
the test of our final hypothesis shows that our analy-
sis not only has descriptive power about the drivers of
alliance choice, but also provides valuable insight into
the performance and eventual fate of alliances formed.
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Table 9. Marginal Effects for Significant Variables: Model 2 of Table 8
Variable dy/dx Std. err. z P > |z | [95% conf. interval]
D 0.0921867 0.0179015 5.15 0.000 0.0571005 0.1272729
exclusive 0.2047171 0.0471409 4.34 0.000 0.1123227 0.2971115
worldwide −0.0751408 0.0374524 −2.01 0.045 −0.1485461 −0.0017355
innov_private −0.1537181 0.0488456 −3.15 0.002 −0.2494537 −0.0579825
partner_size 0.0163938 0.006013 2.73 0.006 0.0046085 0.0281791
part_law_score 0.0070205 0.0022949 3.06 0.002 0.0025226 0.0115184
diff_country −0.0441462 0.017185 −2.57 0.010 −0.0778281 −0.0104643
bio_to_other 0.1135749 0.0227423 4.99 0.000 0.0690007 0.158149
npd_cycle 0.0191502 0.0063066 3.04 0.002 0.0067895 0.0315109
risk −0.352299 0.090945 −3.87 0.000 −0.530548 −0.17405
Note. Marginal effects calculated when all other variables held constant at their means.
Table 9 lists the marginal effects for significant vari-
ables in Model 2 of Table 8. First and foremost, we
would like to point out that deviating from the pre-
diction of our model for alliance structure has sub-
stantial consequences. The average effect of a devia-
tion when other variables are held constant at their
means is a 9% increase in the probability of a termi-
nation in absolute terms. This is a noteworthy impact
on performance considering that the probability of ter-
mination is 24% overall. Exclusive agreements are 20%
more likely to be terminated, and the involvement of
a privately owned innovator reduces the chance of ter-
mination by 15%. Our proxy for asymmetric informa-
tion problems, an agreement where the innovator is
a biotech while the partner is not, leads to an 11%
increase in the probability of a termination. World-
wide agreements (as opposed to regional agreements)
lead to an 8% lower probability of a termination. A 1%
increase in the number of people employed by the part-
ner leads to a 1.6% higher chance of termination, and
each additional stage in the NPD cycle increases the
likelihood of termination by about 2%. When the two
firms are based in different countries, this decreases the
likelihood of a termination by 4%. An alliance that has
a 10% higher risk of failure is about 4% less likely to be
terminated by the parties involved. Each point increase
in the property rights score of the country where the
partner is based leads to a 0.7% increase in the proba-
bility of a termination.
We can infer from Table 10 that the overall proba-
bility of a termination is 0.237, while the conditional
Table 10. Classification Table for Model 2 of Table 8
Predicted
Terminated Not Total
Actual
Terminated 47 127 174
Not 29 531 560
Total 76 658 734
probability that the actual alliance is terminated given
that the prediction is terminated is P(terminated |
pred_terminated)  0.618. Similarly, the overall proba-
bility of an alliance not being terminated is 0.768 while
P(not_terminated | pred_not_terminated)  0.807. The
probability of a correct prediction is 0.787. This is a 23%
improvement over a model that allocates predictions
based on the probabilities 0.237 and 0.763 of being ter-
minated and not being terminated, respectively.
6. Robustness Checks
In Table A.1 in the appendix, we provide robustness
checks regarding our model specification choices. For
ease of comparison, Model 1 of Table A.1 replicates
the main alliance structure model: Model 5 of Table 4.
Model 2 is a random effects regression. We can see
that the results are qualitatively very similar. Mod-
els 3 and 4 provide an alternative test of Hypothe-
sis 3B. Instead of using an interaction term, these mod-
els analyze subsamples of small and large innovators,
respectively. In Model 3, we run a model analogous to
Model 4 of Table 4 for the most risk averse of our sam-
ple of innovators: those with less than 100 employees.
In Model 4, we run a model analogous to Model 4 of
Table 4 for the least risk averse of our sample of inno-
vators: those with more than 500 employees. The coef-
ficient for the variable risk has the expected sign and
is significant for the former, while it is not significant
for the latter group. This provides further support for
Hypothesis 3B. We also carried out further robustness
checks where we varied the employee cutoffs for most
and least risk averse innovators to be 50 and 150 for
small innovators and 400 and 600 for large innovators.
The results are similar and available from the authors
upon request.
In Table A.2 in the appendix, we provide further
robustness checks of our results on alliance struc-
ture. These models test each hypothesis separately by
including only the relevant variable(s) for the tested
hypothesis and omitting those for the other hypothe-
ses. Once again, for ease of comparison, Model 1 of
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Table A.2 replicates the main alliance structure model:
Model 5 of Table 4.Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1.Model 3
tests Hypothesis 2. Model 4 tests Hypothesis 3A, and
Model 5 tests Hypothesis 3B. In each case, the results
are consistent with our main model.
In Table A.3 in the appendix, we report robustness
checks for the alliance performance model. Initially, we
had matched control and treated cases across the fol-
lowing variables: year, bio_to_other, exclusive, worldwide,
innov_private, and npd_cycle. In the first four models,
we match over more variables, which reduces the sam-
ple size. In the final two models, we stop matching
across one variable, which increases the sample size.
In Models 1 and 2, we match across the initial set of
variables as well as risk. In Models 3 and 4, we match
across the initial set of variables as well as the inno-
vator and partner employee counts. Finally, we match
over fewer variables in Models 5 and 6 by matching
over all previous variables except npd_cycle. The effect
of the treatment variable D is significant in all of these
cases, providing further support for Hypothesis 4.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we argued that a key role of operational
decisions is to address contract theoretic concerns faced
by an alliance formed between an innovator and a
partner. Specifically, we suggested that contract theory
has a bearing on the NPD process that determines the
structure of an alliance. The presence or extent of con-
tract theoretic concerns should play a role in whether
the two parties choose to exert further efforts concur-
rently through a collaborative alliance or pass efforts
from the innovator to the partner through a sequen-
tial alliance. Moreover, we also argued that not align-
ing alliance structure with contract theoretic concerns
would adversely affect performance.
We made three specific arguments for the impli-
cations of contract theoretic concerns on the choice
of alliance structure. First, private information hin-
ders the formation of strategic alliances but can be
overcome by sending a credible signal. Innovators can
send a credible signal by putting more of their own
resources on the line through a collaborative alliance.
Second, the holdup problem leads to underinvestment
in relationship-specific assets and can be addressed by
allocating control rights to the party or parties that
have a comparative advantage going forward. In later
stages, where comparative advantage shifts to the part-
ner, a sequential alliance structure ensures that control
rights are allocated to the partner. Third, partners, who
are typically larger firms and are therefore better posi-
tioned to absorb risk, are assumed to be risk neutral in
theory. Risk aversion can be addressed by transferring
risk from the risk-averse party to the risk-neutral (or
less risk-averse) party. For alliances that involve higher
risk, the risk can be transferred to the partner through
a sequential alliance. We tested these arguments with
a discrete choice model predicting the choice between
collaborative and sequential alliances for over 2000 bio-
pharmaceutical alliances. Our results support all three
arguments on the impact of contract theoretic concerns
on alliance choice. However, our results also indicate
that the last of these concerns, risk aversion, is context
specific. Risk plays an important role in the choice for
smaller innovators but not larger ones.
We also argued for a link between alliance perfor-
mance and whether contract theoretic concerns were
appropriately addressed. If contract theoretic concerns
do indeed matter, not addressing them should lead
to poor performance, and eventually to a termination
as the worst case scenario. We tested this argument
using a discrete choice model predicting whether or
not an alliance would be terminated. The main pre-
dictor, a binary variable indicating whether alliance
choice deviated from our prediction, leads to endo-
geneity concerns because it is a function of the result
of previous analysis. We made use of coarsened exact
matching, a method that alleviates the endogeneity
problem by making sure that alliances in treatment
and control groups have similar predispositions to ter-
minations, to show that deviating from the alliance
structure suggested by contract theory predictions sig-
nificantly increases the probability that an alliance will
be terminated. Our research contributes to the litera-
ture in several ways. We take a process design perspec-
tive by focusing on whether alliances should adopt a
collaborative or sequential NPD process. This brings
the alliance choice question to the operations manage-
ment domain. The OM literature on NPDmakes use of
contract theory when modeling alliances. Our results
support the theory developed, which suggests that risk
aversion (e.g., Crama et al. 2008), the holdup problem
(e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2015), and private information
(e.g., Xiao and Xu 2012) should play a role in alliances.
The economics literature has found mixed evidence
about whether the actions or contract choices of deci-
sion makers deviate from the predictions of contract
theory. Our analysis tests and finds support for multi-
ple contract theoretic concerns when decision makers
make operational choices. We also go one step further
and show that there are performance consequences of
deviating from contract theory predictions by studying
counterfactuals. Our analysis goes beyond confirming
theory and also informsmodeling choices in two ways.
First, the OM literature addresses contract theoretic
concerns within either a collaborative or a sequential
NPD process. Our results show that it is also important
to analyze the choice between the two. Second, some
papers in OM assume the innovator to be risk averse,
while others assume the innovator to be risk neutral.
Our results show that risk aversion does play an impor-
tant role and that this role is particularly important for
smaller innovator firms that are less able to diversify.
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Table 11. Trade-offs: How Preference Balance Shifts
Between Alliance Structures for Low/High Levels of
Different Considerations
Level
Consideration Low High
Asymmetric information Sequential Collaborative
Extent of development Collaborative Sequential
Risk of failure Collaborative Sequential
Our findings have two key managerial implications.
First, different alliance structures are more effective in
addressing different contract theoretic concerns. Sec-
ond, ignoring the contract theoretic concerns faced by
the alliance can hinder performance, eventually lead-
ing to a termination. Managers therefore need to make
careful trade-offs to determine the alliance structure
they should adopt. In making these trade-offs, man-
agers should consider the level of asymmetric informa-
tion, the extent of product development, and the level
of risk associated with a project/alliance. We summa-
rize how the presence and level of the different consid-
erations tip the balance toward one alliance structure or
the other in Table 11. When asymmetric information is
high, e.g., because of differences in research specializa-
tion, innovators can signal quality by continuing to be
highly engaged in the NPD process through a collabo-
rative alliance. When the product under consideration
is at an embryonic stage of development, collaborative
alliances should be favored. For alliances with a high
Appendix. Robustness Check Tables
Table A.1. Robustness Checks for Models for Alliance Structure (Dependent Variable: collaborative)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
year 0.0107 0.0096 0.0062 −0.0147
(0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0139) (0.0217)
deal_value 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008)
exclusive 0.4255∗∗∗ 0.4359∗∗∗ 0.4375∗ 0.2853
(0.1170) (0.1176) (0.1728) (0.2678)
worldwide 0.1000 0.1021 −0.0384 0.0207
(0.1128) (0.1135) (0.1663) (0.2671)
innov_size −0.2767 −0.2807 0.1069 −0.0543
(0.1817) (0.1822) (0.0744) (0.0827)
innov_private 0.0413 0.0258 0.0683 0.0365
(0.1126) (0.1131) (0.1527) (0.3137)
partner_size 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.0936∗∗ 0.1245∗∗ 0.1597∗
(0.0282) (0.0319) (0.0433) (0.0714)
partner_private 0.1053 0.0997 −0.0730 0.1594
(0.1223) (0.1257) (0.1825) (0.2740)
alliance_experience −0.0014 0.0109 −0.0013 −0.0111
(0.0052) (0.0121) (0.0073) (0.0270)
risk of technical failure, the partner, who is better able
to absorb risk, can bring value to the table by taking on
more of the risk through a sequential alliance structure.
This last point is more important when dealing with
smaller innovators who are likely to be risk averse.
Our study, of course, has various limitations. We
were unable to cover some alliances because of lack
of data on some companies’ characteristics. While we
had information on whether an alliance was termi-
nated or not, we did not have information on when
an alliance was terminated. Having the latter would
have allowed further insight through survival analysis.
Furthermore, our data set is limited to the biopharma-
ceutical industry. While this is a very important indus-
try from the perspective of new product development
alliances, further research should also test the impli-
cations of contract theory for NPD alliances in other
sectors, such as electronics, where alliances are com-
mon but cycle times are much shorter. This would lead
to further understanding of whether our findings can
be generalized across different sectors or are specific to
the biopharmaceutical industry.
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Table A.1. (Continued).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
innov_law_score 0.0045 0.0043 0.0047 −0.0011
(0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0174) (0.0135)
part_law_score 0.0062 0.0066 0.0008 0.0182
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0212)
relative_industry_exp 0.0011 0.0010 −0.0022 0.0004
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0018)
diff_country 0.0868 0.1258 −0.0479 −0.0133
(0.1036) (0.1052) (0.1546) (0.2372)
bio_to_other 0.3715∗∗ 0.3844∗∗ 0.4665∗ 0.3127
(0.1223) (0.1232) (0.1858) (0.2874)
npd_cycle −0.1662∗∗∗ −0.1674∗∗∗ −0.1378∗∗∗ −0.1625∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0245) (0.0364) (0.0530)
risk −3.5037∗∗ −3.4799∗∗ −2.5575∗∗ −0.9749
(1.3078) (1.3138) (0.7992) (1.0764)
risk× innov_size 0.3471 0.3467
(0.2309) (0.2316)
Partner FE Incl. Incl.
_cons −21.0085 −18.6472 −12.5250 27.4155
(19.1937) (19.3334) (28.0273) (43.5867)
N 2,105 2,105 951 497
Log likelihood −1,274.2739 −1,257.2269 −582.4038 −267.0264
χ2 210.0258 278.1836 87.4577 123.1568
Likelihood ratio test p-value 0.0024 0.0096
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
aA p-value close to zero indicates that the mixed effects model is a better fit than the corresponding logistic regression model. When the
mixed effects model is not a better fit than logistic regression (Model 4), we report the result of the corresponding logistic regression.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table A.2. Further Robustness Checks for Models for Alliance Structure (Dependent Variable: collaborative)
Model 1 Model 2 (H1) Model 3 (H2) Model 4 (H3A) Model 5 (H3B)
year 0.0107 −0.0011 0.0074 −0.0020 −0.0023
(0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0091)
deal_value 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
exclusive 0.4255∗∗∗ 0.2417∗ 0.4461∗∗∗ 0.2285∗ 0.2261∗
(0.1170) (0.1101) (0.1161) (0.1102) (0.1103)
worldwide 0.1000 0.3207∗∗ 0.0913 0.3023∗∗ 0.2974∗∗
(0.1128) (0.1067) (0.1117) (0.1063) (0.1064)
innov_size −0.2767 −0.0224 −0.0140 −0.0343 −0.3032
(0.1817) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0228) (0.1781)
innov_private 0.0413 0.0750 0.0567 0.0784 0.0793
(0.1126) (0.1108) (0.1118) (0.1107) (0.1108)
partner_size 0.1143∗∗∗ 0.1083∗∗∗ 0.1386∗∗∗ 0.1335∗∗∗ 0.1346∗∗∗
(0.0282) (0.0279) (0.0269) (0.0266) (0.0267)
partner_private 0.1053 0.1171 0.1363 0.1077 0.1020
(0.1223) (0.1205) (0.1214) (0.1204) (0.1206)
alliance_experience −0.0014 −0.0001 −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0008
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0051)
innov_law_score 0.0045 0.0022 0.0045 0.0031 0.0035
(0.0090) (0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0088)
part_law_score 0.0062 0.0066 0.0075 0.0091 0.0091
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071)
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Table A.2. (Continued).
Model 1 Model 2 (H1) Model 3 (H2) Model 4 (H3A) Model 5 (H3B)
relative_industry_exp 0.0011 0.0016 0.0015 0.0020∗ 0.0020∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
diff_country 0.0868 0.0672 0.1117 0.0939 0.0946
(0.1036) (0.1018) (0.1025) (0.1012) (0.1013)
bio_to_other 0.3715∗∗ 0.3463∗∗
(0.1223) (0.1202)
npd_cycle −0.1662∗∗∗ −0.1584∗∗∗
(0.0244) (0.0241)
risk −3.5037∗∗ −1.2756∗∗ −3.0875∗
(1.3078) (0.4907) (1.2879)
risk× innov_size 0.3471 0.3454
(0.2309) (0.2266)
_cons −21.0085 −0.3841 −17.2200 2.1089 4.2419
(19.1937) (18.5104) (18.9491) (18.4924) (18.5189)
N 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105 2,105
Log likelihood −1,274.2739 −1,303.6258 −1,285.2334 −1,304.3605 −1,303.1855
χ2 210.0258 170.7609 192.5046 169.3756 171.3549
Likelihood ratio test p-value 0.0024 0.0020 0.0026 0.0027 0.0024
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table A.3. CEM Robustness Checks for Models for Alliance Performance (Dependent Variable: terminated)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
D 0.8222∗∗∗ 0.7450∗∗ 0.8648∗∗∗ 0.9792∗∗ 0.3900∗∗ 0.4351∗∗∗
(0.2107) (0.2785) (0.2389) (0.3029) (0.1326) (0.1278)
year −0.0383 −0.0549 −0.0761∗∗∗
(0.0501) (0.0318) (0.0227)
deal_value 0.0057 0.0011 0.0022
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0016)
exclusive 1.2397∗∗ 1.2787∗∗∗ 0.6321∗∗
(0.4186) (0.3715) (0.1941)
worldwide 0.0419 0.1852 −0.2523
(0.3296) (0.3552) (0.1629)
innov_private −0.4705 −1.7357∗∗∗ −0.8815∗∗∗
(0.4075) (0.2276) (0.1580)
partner_size −0.0818∗ 0.1278∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0234) (0.0199)
partner_private −0.0115 −0.1088 0.1907
(0.4632) (0.1570) (0.1704)
alliance_experience 0.0023 0.0005 −0.0080
(0.0138) (0.0106) (0.0065)
innov_law_score −0.0240 −0.0536∗∗ −0.0062
(0.0253) (0.0170) (0.0124)
part_law_score 0.1219∗∗∗ 0.0602∗∗∗ 0.0384∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0069) (0.0111)
relative_industry_exp −0.0001 0.0027 0.0016
(0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0019)
diff_country 0.1078 −0.2238 0.0610
(0.4617) (0.3712) (0.1812)
bio_to_other 1.4448∗∗∗ 0.9926∗∗∗ 0.6855∗∗∗
(0.2131) (0.1841) (0.1270)
npd_cycle 0.2541∗∗ 0.2348∗∗ 0.1338∗∗
(0.0918) (0.0813) (0.0442)
risk −5.9547 −9.0686 −1.6275
(4.9819) (5.7177) (1.6280)
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Table A.3. (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
innov_size −0.5841 −0.9566 −0.0495
(1.0265) (0.8769) (0.1232)
risk× innov_size 0.6066 1.0450 −0.0920
(1.2270) (0.9975) (0.1492)
_cons −2.0754∗∗∗ 69.8155 −1.8390∗∗∗ 112.4477 −1.3839∗∗∗ 148.1007∗∗
(0.1271) (97.5320) (0.1427) (59.0125) (0.0514) (45.5080)
Partner FE Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
N 324 324 304 304 1,202 1,202
Log likelihood −135.6686 −112.7693 −145.5538 −113.5407 −650.3062 −574.0704
Pseudo-R2 0.0703 0.2272 0.0842 0.2856 0.0244 0.1388
Notes. Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Endnotes
1We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that our analysis
presents a stricter test of alliance performance.
2Moral hazard occurs when an agent carries out nonobservable or
nonverifiable tasks, which cannot bemeaningfullywritten into a con-
tract. The factors that are central to our paper (private information,
holdup, and risk aversion) are explained in more detail in the next
section.
3While we make use of nonlinear models we have chosen to express
the model in linear form here for simplicity. The terms Y, α, X, β,
D, δ, and  are, respectively, the dependent variable (terminated), a
constant, a vector of independent variables, a vector of coefficients,
the treatment variable, the coefficient for the treatment variable, and
the error term.
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